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The 2002 neighbor-
hoods of experimental-
group families that had
moved more than once
still offered distinctly
more favorable envi-
ronments than those
participants lived in
before the MTO
demonstration.
The 1980s saw a marked increase in the
number of inner-city neighborhoods with
high concentrations of poverty. By the start
of the next decade, Wilson (1987) and other
scholars had documented the seriously
detrimental effects such neighborhoods
have on their residents, and poverty de-
concentration had become a topic of in-
terest in Washington. One federal effort
launched to learn more about how to
address the issue was the Moving to
Opportunity demonstration (MTO). 
Implemented by the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), MTO enrolled more than 4,600
low-income families in five metropolitan
areas (metros)—Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York—
between 1994 and 1998. The participants,
most of whom were racial or ethnic
minorities and all of whom were living in
inner-city HUD-assisted housing projects,
were randomly assigned to one of three
treatment groups: an experimental group,
a Section 8 group, and a control group 
(see text box on page 11 for more details).
As a part of an interim evaluation,
MTO families were interviewed in 2002,
four to eight years after they began partici-
pation. This brief examines the characteris-
tics of the neighborhoods to which MTO
families in all groups had moved as of
those interviews. The interim assessment
included a basic analysis of this topic, rely-
ing primarily on measures from the U.S.
Census (Orr et al. 2003). This brief summa-
rizes the results of that analysis but then
goes further in two respects:
1. by comparing the neighborhoods of the
various groups using a broader array of
indicators (e.g., distance from central
business district, crime rate) and show-
ing how the MTO destination neigh-
borhoods compare with those of all
Section 8 voucher recipients in the MTO
metros, and
2. by focusing analysis on one group 
that is of special interest for policy:
experimental-group families that moved
again after their initial move to a low-
poverty neighborhood. 
The new data strongly reinforce find-
ings of the earlier research, showing that
the neighborhoods experimental-group
families moved to initially were indeed
better than those they had left behind in
many dimensions. And the magnitude of
the differences is striking. For example, the
violent crime rate in their new neighbor-
hoods was on average 72 percent lower
than that of their old neighborhoods. 
Perhaps the most troubling finding of
the interim evaluation, however, was that
some of the initial gains had eroded by
2002; a sizeable share of the experimental-
group families had moved again by then,
and many of those moves appeared to be in
the wrong direction, back to neighborhoods
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with higher concentrations of poverty
and minority residents. This brief
looks at the 2002 destination neighbor-
hoods of these participants in more
depth and finds that, in fact, they still
offered distinctly more favorable envi-
ronments than those participants lived
in before the demonstration. More
telling, these neighborhoods were sub-
stantially better on average than the
2002 neighborhoods of the MTO
Section 8 group—those who had also
moved with Section 8 vouchers but
were not required to move to a low-
income neighborhood initially. This
certainly supports the hypothesis that
the initial move requirements made a
difference. 
Summary of Earlier Findings
The neighborhoods where MTO
experimental-group families lived
before the program were indeed
among the most distressed in their
metropolitan areas: 93 percent lived
in neighborhoods with poverty rates
exceeding 30 percent (compared with
only 12 percent of all households
nationally), and 91 percent lived in
tracts where minorities accounted for
60 percent or more of the population
(compared with a metropolitan aver-
age of 38 percent nationally).
It was hoped that participants 
in the MTO demonstration would
notably enhance their well-being and
life chances by moving to much bet-
ter neighborhoods. That is in fact
what occurred, although not always
in predicted ways (table 1).
 For various reasons, many families
selected by random assignment 
(53 percent of the experimental
group and 39 percent of the Section
8 group) were unable to “lease up”
and use their program vouchers.
 Those who did lease up and move,
however, moved as required to
neighborhoods with much lower
poverty rates. Most experimental
movers complied with program
rules and moved initially to tracts
with 1990 poverty rates below 
10 percent, but many of these tracts
experienced increases in poverty
over the decade. Still, 91 percent of
participants’ initial moves were to
neighborhoods with less than 
20 percent poverty in 2000. Among
initial Section 8 group moves, 
26 percent achieved that standard.
Although they did not receive
vouchers, a surprising 70 percent of
the control group had also moved
by 2002, but only 17 percent of
them moved to neighborhoods
with 2000 poverty rates below 
20 percent. For the movers’ initial
destination neighborhoods, the
average poverty rates were 13 per-
cent for the experimental group, 
29 percent for the Section 8 group,
and 34 percent for the control group.
 These moves, however, did not
make as much of a difference in
minority concentrations. The shares
of initial moves to neighborhoods
where minorities represented less
than 20 percent of the 2000 total
population were only 5.7 percent 
for experimental-group movers, 
2.2 percent for Section 8–group 
TABLE 1.  Summary Comparison of Neighborhood Characteristics: MTO Experimental, Section 8, and Control Groups
Source: Urban Institute analysis of interim assessment survey data.
MTO EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
Total All Program Movers Section 8 Control
group group
Original 2002 Initial move 2002 2002 2002
No. of tracts 117 751 380 505 617 514 
No. households (000) 1,715 1,477 815 695 1,027 1,133 
Percent of Total Households
By poverty rate, 2000 
0–10% 0 13 41 24 6 4 
10–20% 2 22 50 35 20 13 
20–30% 5 16 8 19 19 15 
30–40% 20 19 1 12 23 21 
40+% 73 30 1 10 33 47 
By percent minority, 2000
0–20% 0 4 11 6 3 2 
20–40% 4 7 13 11 5 5 
40–60% 3 7 15 10 8 6 
60–80% 4 9 16 13 8 10 
80+% 89 74 45 60 76 77
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movers, and 2.6 percent for control-
group movers. For the movers’ ini-
tial destination neighborhoods, the
average neighborhood minority
shares were 68 percent for the
experimental group, 84 percent for
the Section 8 group, and 85 percent
for the control group.
 A substantial share of the initial
movers (65 percent of experimental-
group lease-ups and 66 percent of
Section 8–group lease-ups) had
made one or more additional
moves by the time of the 2002 inter-
views. For the experimental group,
these moves tended to reverse some
of the initial gains. The average
poverty rate of the 2002 neighbor-
hoods of these families was 24 per-
cent (up from 13 percent for the
initial moves), and the average
minority share was 79 percent 
(up from 68 percent for the initial
moves). In contrast, poverty and
minority rates of 2002 neighbor-
hoods for multiple movers in the
Section 8 group were much the
same as the destinations of their
initial moves.
 Considering the experimental
group as a whole (all families the
program “intended to treat”), fami-
lies on average were living in much
better neighborhoods in 2002 than
when the demonstration began,
although the contrasts with the
other groups were not as great as
might have been expected ahead of
time. Experimental-group scores
were not as good as they would
have been if a higher share had
leased up and fewer movers had
moved back to poorer neighbor-
hoods. And the scores for the other
two groups were better than might
have been expected because of
their own mobility. As shown in
table 1, differences in poverty rates
between the groups were nonethe-
less substantial. The shares of fami-
lies in neighborhoods with poverty
rates below 20 percent in 2002 were
35 percent for the full experimental
group, 26 percent for the Section 8
group, and 17 percent for the con-
trol group. Differences in racial and
ethnic composition, however, are
not as large. The average minority
percentages of the 2002 neighbor-
hoods were 83 percent for the ex-
perimental group, 86 percent for
the Section 8 group, and 88 percent
for the control group.
These results were fairly uniform
across the five MTO sites (table 2).
Looking at the 2002 neighborhoods of
all groups, the basic pattern was the
same everywhere. For both poverty
and race, on average, experimental-
group movers lived in less-concentrated
neighborhoods than the overall ex-
perimental group, which in turn had
better scores than the MTO Section 8
group and, by an even larger extent,
the control group. There were varia-
tions, but they may be at least partly
explained by differences in poverty
and racial or ethnic concentration in
these metro areas overall. MTO out-
comes were generally more favorable
in Boston than in the other sites, par-
ticularly versus racial concentration
in Chicago, New York, and Los
Angeles. But, as shown in the table,
smaller shares of all Boston metro
tracts had high concentrations of 
poor and minority households to
begin with (particularly compared
with Los Angeles and New York).
Neighborhood Outcomes 
for Movers
The evidence is clear that MTO 
experimental-group movers gained
substantially from their initial reloca-
tion to low-poverty neighborhoods
(Goering and Feins 2003; Orr et al.
2003). In a few areas (e.g., employment
and school achievement), there was 
not as much improvement as hoped,
but changes were positive and note-
worthy in several others (e.g., safety,
mental and physical health, physical
TABLE 2.  2002 Neighborhoods by MTO Site
Source: Urban Institute analysis of interim assessment survey data.
Los New
Total Baltimore Boston Chicago Angeles York
Percent in tracts with poverty rates < 20%
Exp. group—total 35 39 44 31 31 26 
Exp. group—moved 59 57 71 64 45 57 
Section 8 group 26 29 33 21 22 12 
Control group 17 26 23 19 7 5 
All metro households (2000) 78 86 90 85 67 63 
Percent in tracts with minority shares < 60%
Exp. group—total 18 21 42 7 12 8 
Exp. group—moved 27 29 61 13 18 12 
Section 8 group 16 19 38 5 5 7 
Control group 13 13 34 3 4 6 
All metro households (2000) 69 80 93 74 44 53 
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aspects of housing and the neighborhood
environment). 
Among the findings of the interim
assessment, however, perhaps the greatest
worry was that so many initial beneficiaries
had moved back in what seemed the wrong
direction by 2002, possibly threatening the
gains that had been achieved. These results
led one researcher to suggest they were a
“telling indication of how difficult it is to
intervene in the complex process of housing
choice” and to conclude that they raise
“questions about the cost benefits of the
intervention policy” (Clark 2005, 15312).
It is not surprising that so many 
experimental-group families had moved 
by 2002. A large share of America’s families
move every year, and rates are typically
highest among low-income groups. The
question is what kinds of neighborhoods
participants chose after their initial exposure
to better neighborhoods in MTO. Does the
process represent a slippery slope on which
participants eventually wind up moving
back to seriously distressed environments
like those where they started, or do their
locational choices represent some third way?
These later moves have not been exam-
ined carefully to this point. To go further,
we believe it is most relevant to compare
the neighborhood destinations of the
experimental-group multiple movers to
multiple movers in the MTO Section 8
group because their characteristics are so
similar (predominantly low-income minor-
ity families originating in distressed inner-
city HUD projects). 
However, we also make new compar-
isons to the locational patterns of two other
groups: (1) all Section 8 voucher holders in
these five metros (as of 2004—likely to live
in better neighborhoods on average than
the MTO Section 8 families); and (2) all
households living in these metros (as of
2000—likely to be even more heavily
weighted toward better neighborhoods). 
We begin by looking at differences in
poverty and minority rates but then look at
several other indicators. We find that the
2002 neighborhoods of the experimental-
group families with multiple moves are
notably better on average than those of
their MTO Section 8–group counterparts in
many dimensions. This analysis presents
only the broad quantitative differences. A
companion brief in this series examines
housing search processes in the demonstra-
tion (Boston, Los Angeles, and New York,
only), emphasizing MTO participants’
perspectives as well as market context
(Comey, Briggs, and Weismann 2008). This
work helps us understand what is driving
the outcomes described here. 
Poverty and Minority Rates
The top chart in figure 1 shows that, consis-
tent with the averages presented earlier, the
2002 neighborhoods of multiple movers
from the experimental group were consid-
erably less poor than those of the MTO
Section 8 group. Almost half (47 percent) of
the experimental group had found new res-
idences in neighborhoods with low poverty
rates (less than 20 percent), compared with
only 32 percent of MTO Section 8 families.
The comparable shares were exactly 50 per-
cent for all Section 8 voucher holders and
78 percent for all metro households. Most
strikingly, 18 percent of the experimental
group made its most recent moves to neigh-
borhoods with less than 10 percent poverty,
compared with only 7 percent of MTO
Section 8 multiple movers. 
The second chart shows that again,
however, the differences in minority con-
centrations were not as great: 77 percent of
the experimental-group multiple movers
lived in tracts where minorities represented
60 percent or more of the population in
2002. This compares with a yet-higher 
85 percent for the MTO Section 8 group 
but only 61 percent for all voucher holders
and 31 percent for all metro households. 
Poverty Rate Trajectories
The bottom chart in figure 1 warrants more
explanation. We divided all census tracts in
the five MTO metros into three groups
based on how their poverty rates changed
over a decade: improved (poverty rate went
down 5 percentage points or more), wors-
ened (poverty rate went up 5 points or
more), and remained stable (rate changed less
than 5 points in either direction). Calcu-
lating these proportions for the 100 largest
U.S. metropolitan areas, 11 percent of all
tracts improved in the 1990s (up impres-
sively from only 8 percent in the 1980s), and
most of those started out in the high-
poverty categories. This corroborates what
has become a well-known finding calcu-
lated in other ways—namely, that there was 
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FIGURE 1. Neighborhoods of MTO Movers and Comparison Groups: Poverty Rates, Minority Rates and
Change in Poverty (percent)
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Source: Urban Institute analysis of interim assessment survey data.
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a notable drop in the concentration of pov-
erty in metropolitan America in the 1990s
(Jargowsky 2003; Kingsley and Pettit 2003). 
However, less has been made of the
fact that an even larger share of tracts
“worsened” in the 1990s: 15 percent of the
total in the 100 largest metros. This is still
consistent with the deconcentration of
poverty trend, however, since that number
represented a sizeable decrease from the
1980s, when 19 percent had declined. Not
surprisingly, most of the worsening tracts
started out in the lower poverty categories. 
The bar charts indicate what might at
first appear to be a strange pattern. A size-
able share of the destination neighborhoods
of the initial experimental-group movers
(43 percent) and of those who made subse-
quent moves (31 percent) was worsening.
In contrast, only 1 percent of the initial
move destinations, and 14 percent of the
subsequent move destinations, were im-
proving. This pattern is explained mostly
just by where these different types of tracts
tend to be. Generally, tracts with lower
poverty rates were much more likely to be
worsening and those with higher poverty
rates were more likely to be improving. 
It seems that the fact that MTO
experimental-group movers generally went
to high-minority neighborhoods, however,
also played an important role in this find-
ing. In the five MTO metros, predominantly
minority tracts (those where minorities
accounted for more than 60 percent of the
2000 population) accounted for 63 percent
of all tracts that worsened in the 1990s, and
those in the 10–60 percent minority range
accounted for another 34 percent. Tracts
with fewer than 20 percent minority resi-
dents accounted for 21 percent of all tracts
in these metros but for only 3 percent of the
worsening tracts. In other words, among
tracts with comparatively low poverty
rates, those that worsened in the 1990s
were generally those where minorities were
present in significant numbers in 2000.
On this indicator too, the pattern for
multiple movers in the experimental group
is better than that for the MTO Section 8
group: 31 percent of the 2002 neighbor-
hoods of the former had worsened, com-
pared with 35 percent for the latter.
Social and Housing Conditions
Table 3 compares the neighborhoods of the
different groups using a broader set of indi-
cators. The first contrasts of note here are
those between the neighborhoods the
experimental-group movers lived in before
the program and those of their initial move.
For example, on average, the former had a
dramatically higher public assistance rate
(39 percent versus 10 percent), a higher share
of residents over 25 lacking high school
degrees (51 percent versus 22 percent), and a
lower homeownership rate (11 percent ver-
sus 56 percent). The populations of their old
neighborhoods had dropped by 17 percent
on average over the 1990s, whereas their
new neighborhoods witnessed an average 
9 percent population growth.
On these indicators too, the 2002 neigh-
borhoods of the experimental-group multi-
ple movers score consistently worse than
those of the experimental-group initial
movers but better than those of the movers
in the MTO Section 8 group. In several
cases the differences are fairly small, but
they are sizeable for some important mea-
sures of neighborhood quality and health.
Comparing the 2002 neighborhoods of mul-
tiple movers in the experimental group ver-
sus the MTO Section 8 group, the former
had significantly higher population growth
over the 1990s (7 percent versus 4 percent),
fewer residents over age 25 without a high
school degree (33 percent versus 37 per-
cent), and, perhaps most important, a
notably higher rate of homeownership 
(41 percent versus 34 percent).
The average scores for the neighbor-
hoods of MTO Section 8–group movers
were, with much consistency, worse than
those for all voucher holders in these metro-
politan areas. The latter were, in turn, more
like those of the experimental-group multi-
ple movers. This comparison is significant.
All movers in the MTO experimental and
Section 8 groups had been living in some of
the most troubled concentrated poverty
environments in their cities, while Section 8
voucher recipients had previously lived in
much better neighborhoods on average (a
notable share came from the suburbs). The
fact that the MTO experimental-group mul-
tiple movers wound up in neighborhoods
similar to the overall voucher population
thus marks a notable positive change for
them given their backgrounds. 
Most would expect the average neigh-
borhood conditions of all households in
these metropolitan areas to be even better
than the average for voucher recipients. To
Metropolitan Housing and Communities
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our knowledge, however, this brief is the
only place to date where that comparison
is made explicitly. The results are generally
as anticipated. For example, the average
2000 poverty rate for the voucher holders
was 22 percent compared with 13 percent
for all households; the homeownership
rate was 39 percent for the former versus
55 percent for the latter. The average
minority population share was 64 percent
for the neighborhoods of voucher 
holders compared with 42 percent for 
all households.
In the context of this brief, two things
warrant emphasis. First, the contrasts in
well-being between the conditions in the
original neighborhoods of MTO partici-
pants and those in the neighborhoods of
voucher holders on average are dramati-
cally greater than those between the latter
and the average conditions for all metro-
politan households. Second, the initial
move neighborhoods of MTO experimental
households were notably better on a num-
ber of dimensions than the average for
voucher recipients. 
Violent Crime Rates
The interim evaluation showed that many
in the experimental group felt that moving
away from the stress of a high-crime envi-
ronment was the greatest benefit of their
participation in MTO. Data on violent
crimes are available at the tract level (from
Peterson and Krivo 2006) for only three of
the five sites, but the conclusion is consis-
tent in all three: crime rates in participants’
pre-MTO neighborhoods were indeed dra-
matically higher than in the neighborhoods
they first moved to under MTO. Figure 2
shows that the number of violent crimes
per 1,000 population per year (average for
the 1999–2001 period) was 39.8 in the for-
mer versus only 11.2 in the latter (72 per-
cent lower). 
The 2002 neighborhoods of experimental-
group families that moved again had a
TABLE 3.  Selected Neighborhood Characteristics of MTO Movers and Comparison Groups (percent)
Source: Urban Institute analysis of interim assessment survey data.
Note: Movers include only those moving in compliance with program rules.
MTO Experimental-Group Movers
MTO All metro
Move after Section 8 Section 8 All metro
Original Initial initial move movers vouchers households
neighborhood move 2002 2002 2004 2000
Demographics
Minority 91 67 79 85 64 42 
Foreign born 18 21 19 21 22 21 
Population growth 1990–2000 –17 9 7 4 8 16 
Moved 1995–2000 43 42 44 46 46 44 
Income and employment 
Population below poverty level 50 12 24 28 22 13 
Population > age 16 not working 65 41 49 52 47 40 
Other social indicators
Households receiving public assistance 39 10 20 22 17 9 
Population > age 25 with no high school 
degree 51 22 33 37 31 21 
Female-headed households with children 65 33 45 48 38 23 
Population age 16–19 not working or in 
school 23 10 14 16 13 9 
Housing
Owner-occupied housing 11 56 41 34 39 55 
Rental vacancy rate 7 5 6 6 5 4 
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notably higher violent crime rate than that:
22.2 per 1,000, about the same as the aver-
ages for the neighborhoods of the MTO
Section 8 movers and for all Section 8 fam-
ilies in these cities. What is striking, how-
ever, is that this level still represents a
marked improvement over the 39.8 aver-
age for the neighborhoods the experimen-
tal families lived in before MTO.
Metropolitan Location
It is important to know not only the com-
parative poverty rates of the destination
neighborhoods for these groups, but also
where in their metropolitan areas they
were located. If most experimental-group
movers relocated to low-poverty areas
very near their original inner-city projects,
we would expect higher risks of future
problems than if they moved to locations
much farther out in the metropolis.
Whether the move destinations were con-
centrated in just a few locations or more
spread out could have very different impli-
cations for jurisdictional responsibilities
and responses. 
To find out about these patterns, we
divided the tracts in each of the five metro-
politan areas into seven geographical divi-
sions (following the approach developed
by Berube and Forman 2002). The first
includes all central-city tracts with cen-
troids located within one mile of the cen-
troid of the central business district (CBD).
We then established three other rings
within the central city, dividing all remain-
ing central-city tracts into terciles based on
the distance between their centroids and
that of the CBD. Finally, we defined three
suburban rings similarly, dividing all sub-
urban tracts into terciles based on the dis-
tance between their centroids and that of
the central-city CBD.
As shown in table 4, the patterns 
were again strongly contrasting. Whereas
38 percent of the experimental-group
movers moved to the suburbs initially,
only 25 percent of those who moved again
lived in suburban neighborhoods in 2002,
though this was still a much larger share
than the 14 percent registered by the MTO
Section 8–group movers. It is not surpris-
ing that the suburban share for all metro-
politan voucher holders (44 percent) was
so much higher than those for the MTO
groups, since many of the former started
out in suburban locations.
Both within the central cities and
within the suburbs, the 2002 locations of
the experimental-group multiple movers
tended to be more decentralized (fewer in
the inner rings and more in the outer rings)
than their MTO Section 8 counterparts.
FIGURE 2.  Violent Crime Rates for Neighborhoods of MTO Movers and Comparison Groups
Source: Urban Institute analysis of interim assessment survey data.
Notes: Data shown are for Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Violent crime rate = average annual aggravated assaults, robberies,
and murders per 1,000 population, 1999–2001.
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The largest contrast between these
groups appears in the bottom rows of 
table 4. While there has been much con-
jecture about the spatial concentration 
of Section 8 voucher holders in urban
America, the data show that the pattern in
the five MTO metros, at least, was dis-
persed in 2004. Only 10 percent of all
voucher holders lived in tracts where
voucher holders account for 10 percent or
more of all households. In fact, 38 percent
lived in neighborhoods where the Section 8
share was miniscule (less than 2 percent of
all households).
The locations of the MTO experimental-
group’s initial moves were even more dis-
persed than that: 56 percent had moved 
to tracts where voucher holders repre-
sented less than 2 percent of all house-
holds. Most impressive here, however, is
the fact that those from this group who
moved again did not much diminish that
rate; 50 percent still lived in such tracts in
2002. This represents a pronounced dif-
ference from the result for the MTO 
Section 8–group movers, where consider-
ably less than half that share (21 percent)
wound up in these low–Section 8 density
neighborhoods. 
Conclusions and Implications
Prior research has shown that the initial
neighborhoods MTO experimental-group
families moved to represented a marked
improvement over the environments of
concentrated poverty and distress in which
they had lived before. The new data pre-
sented in this brief reinforce that conclu-
sion along additional dimensions and
allow us to see comparisons more sharply.
For many key indicators of neighborhood
well-being, these MTO initial move neigh-
borhoods scored closer to the averages for
the neighborhoods of all households than
they did even for those of all Section 8
voucher recipients.
But will this make a difference in the
long run? Clearly, the data presented here
cannot answer that question in a satisfying
manner. They do, however, offer hints in
that direction.
Metropolitan Housing and Communities
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TABLE 4.  Neighborhoods of MTO Movers and Comparison Groups: Distance from Central Business District (CBD) and Concentration of 
Section 8 Vouchers (percent)
Source: Urban Institute analysis of interim assessment survey data.
Notes: Movers include only those moving in compliance with program rules. All households refers to all households in the five metro areas.
MTO Experimental-Group Movers
MTO All metro
Move after Section 8 Section 8 All metro
Original Initial initial move movers vouchers households
neighborhood move 2002 2002 2004 2000
Households by city/suburban location
Central city 100 62 75 86 56 42 
Suburbs — 38 25 14 44 58 
By location in central city
City CBD + ring 1 52 9 28 30 24 26 
City, ring 2 31 26 32 33 38 30 
City, ring 3 16 65 40 37 39 44 
By location in suburbs
Suburbs, ring 1 — 35 40 52 36 27 
Suburbs, ring 2 — 53 37 38 31 33 
Suburbs, ring 3 0 12 24 10 33 40 
Households by Section 8 voucher holders as 
percentage of households in tract
< 2% 71 56 50 21 38 76 
2–4.9% 14 31 22 33 30 16 
5–9.9% 12 11 17 28 22 6 
10% or more 3 2 11 18 10 2 
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Suppose the experimental group had
been offered vouchers but had neither been
required to move to low-poverty neighbor-
hoods initially nor received counseling to
help them do so. We would expect they
would wind up in neighborhoods similar
to those of the MTO Section 8 group, since
both the characteristics of the households
and the program treatment for both groups
would then have been the same. But that
clearly did not occur. 
By 2002, many in the experimental
group continued to live in their initial move
neighborhoods, with scores on relevant indi-
cators considerably better than those of the
MTO Section 8 group at that time. More
important, the 2002 neighborhoods of exper-
imental households with multiple moves
also scored notably better along many di-
mensions, on average, than those of the
MTO Section 8 group, albeit by not nearly as
much as those of their own initial moves. 
It is important to remember that the
averages mask considerable variation. By
2002, a significant number of the experi-
mental households with multiple moves
had relocated to higher-end communities
much like those they had moved to initially.
At the other extreme, an even larger num-
ber had moved back to highly distressed
inner-city neighborhoods, and more fell in
between. That same sort of locational diver-
sity characterizes the destinations of the
MTO Section 8 group. It is just that a much
smaller share of that group wound up at
the better end, and many more wound up
at the worse end, of the distribution. 
While more remains to be learned,
Comey and colleagues (2008) provide
insights on the motivations behind the
locational choices of both groups, showing
that they are indeed complex and varied.
Nonetheless, recognizing all the complex-
ity, the net effect is still important for pub-
lic policy. The evidence presented here
shows that the net yield in neighborhood
betterment will be higher by investing in
the experimental approach than in the
MTO Section 8 approach. Determining
whether those benefits are worth the addi-
tional costs will require further research.
The question warrants priority in future
studies of MTO. 
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The Moving to Opportunity Demonstration
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched the Moving
to Opportunity Demonstration (MTO) in 1994 in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. MTO was a voluntary relocation program for very low
income residents of public and assisted housing located in high-poverty neighborhoods in
these cities. Those who volunteered were randomly assigned to one of three treatment
groups: a control group (families retained their public housing unit, but received no new assis-
tance); a Section 8 comparison group (families received the standard counseling and a voucher
subsidy for use in the private housing market); or an experimental group. The experimental
group families received special relocation counseling (focused on opportunities to live in 
low-poverty areas) and search assistance. They also received a voucher usable only in a low-
poverty neighborhood (less than 10 percent poor as of the 1990 Census), with the requirement
that the family live there for at least one year. 
Of the 1,820 families assigned to the experimental group, just under half (48 percent, or 860)
found a willing landlord with a suitable rental unit and moved successfully or “leased up”; they
were experimental “complier” families. The MTO Interim Impacts Evaluation—conducted in
2002, approximately five to seven years after families relocated—found that many experi-
mental group families had moved again, some of them several times—and many moved out 
of their low-poverty neighborhoods. In addition, about 70 percent of the control group had
moved out of public housing, mostly to other poor urban neighborhoods. Families in the MTO
experimental group, however, were still much more likely to be living in low-poverty areas
(whether the original placement areas or other areas) than their Section 8 voucher or control
family counterparts. MTO families also had lived for longer periods in such areas than families
in the other two groups. 
The Three-City Study of MTO 
The Three-City Study of MTO is a large-scale, mixed-method study focused on three MTO
sites: Boston, Los Angeles, and New York. The study was designed to examine key puzzles
that emerged in previous MTO research, including the Interim Evaluation, and combines analy-
sis of MTO survey, census, and neighborhood indicator data with new, qualitative data collec-
tion. The family-level data were collected in 2004 and 2005—about 6 to 10 years after families’
initial placement through the MTO program and 2 years after the Interim Evaluation data collec-
tion. First, we randomly selected 122 families, conducting 276 semistructured, in-depth quali-
tative interviews with parents, adolescents, and young adults in all three treatment groups. 
We included compliers (those who successfully moved at the outset) and noncompliers (those
who did not move through the program) in the experimental and comparison groups, although
we weighted compliers more heavily. Overall, we conducted 81 interviews in Boston, 120 in
Los Angeles, and 75 in New York. The combined cooperation rate (consents as a share of eligi-
ble households contacted) was 80 percent. Next, we launched “family-focused” ethnographic
fieldwork, visiting a subset of 39 control group and experimental-complier families repeatedly
over six to eight months. The cooperation rate for the ethnographic subsample was 70 percent.
The Three-City Study of MTO is housed at the Urban Institute. The principal investigators are
Xavier de Souza Briggs of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Susan Popkin of the
Urban Institute, and John Goering of the City University of New York. The study is funded by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Annie E. Casey, Fannie Mae,
Rockefeller, Smith-Richardson, and William T. Grant Foundations.
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